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Abstract: We examine the relationship between growth opportunities and insolvency risk in a me-
diating framework through financing decisions for 330 listed firms on the Pakistan Stock 
Exchange (PSX) This study covers a data period of five years ranging from 2013 to 2017. 
Financing decisions used in this study involve capital structure decision and debt matu-
rity decision. We applied robust clustered panel OLS regression to the data and found 
a negative relationship between growth opportunities and insolvency risk in all samples 
consisting of overall, large and small firms. Growth opportunities have a negative impact 
on the capital structure, but debt maturity was influenced positively. Financing decisions 
influenced the insolvency risk positively. We used Baron and Kenny’s (1986) approach to 
detect the intervening effects of financing decisions. Further, Sobel’s test used to check 
the significance of mediation. Partial mediation was found for the debt maturity ratio in 
the large and overall sample of firms. However, the capital structure did not mediate the 
relationship between growth opportunities and insolvency risk in this study.
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JEL Classification: G30, G32
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Introduction
Firm failure is a growing phenomenon in today’s competitive environment, especial-
ly for new firms trying to grow (Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2004; Sun, Li, Huang, & He, 
2014; Lukason & Laitinen, 2016). Previous research confined to the external factors 
that hinder the growth of young and small enterprises. There is a lack of literature 
that focuses on the contribution of internal processes and decisions, which may put 
the firms on the right track or opposite notes cause ultimate failure. Firms that have 
growth potential may require more finances as compared to mature firms. Financing 
comes with the cost that includes agency cost, financial cost and finally bankruptcy 
costs if not handled properly. The importance of financing decisions is well docu-
mented in corporate finance literature. Many factors lead the decision-makers to opt 
for a particular financing policy, but this study emphasizes the impact of growth op-
portunities on insolvency risk influenced through financing decisions taken. There is 
diversity in financing resources raised, and the extent to which a particular resource 
preferred over the other is also diverse. For example, the choice between equity and 
debt is a first option (if an exclusive choice made) and how much to invest in equity 
and debt termed as the capital structure is another choice (if both sources used). Sim-
ilarly, if the debt used in the capital structure, its maturity is another crucial decision 
as a part of the financing decision. The cost of financing is another critical aspect that 
can be placed under this umbrella but mostly regarded as a determinant of capital 
structure and debt structure rather than being a part of it. However, the higher cost 
of financing might also contribute to the higher insolvency risk. Rationality seems 
to be in less risky situations, but the literature suggests that the managers sometimes 
take aggressive positions and earn abnormal profits. Thus, risk-taking is not always 
thought to be evil. Risk cannot still be regarded as a hazard but also an opportunity 
to prosper and grow. According to Kim (2011), firms with more foreign investors take 
more risk, and such risk has a positive relationship with growth opportunities. There-
fore, growth opportunities can be regarded as determinants of risk levels attained by 
any organization, but an organization can not avail of any opportunity without proper 
resources needed to indulge in any venture.
Resource dependency theory postulates that managers need to deploy their re-
sources in such a way that enables them to reconfigure their resources to take advan-
tage of the numerous opportunities available. Mateev & Anastasov (2010), argued 
that an organization’s growth potentials have a relationship to firm size and are also 
associated with its financial mix. Therefore, what resources, whether financial or 
non-financial secure vital positions in the hands of management. The pecking order 
theory suggests that organizations follow a distinct pattern in the utilization of finan-
cial resources. The proponents of this theory state that organizations prefer funds in 
an order in which retained earnings, debt, and equity secure first, second, and third 
ranks, respectively. All of these options have varied economic consequences. For 
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example, the debt is thought to be riskier as compared to the other two options, but it 
is also a tool to discipline the managers at the same time. The availability of retained 
profits is an ideal situation where organizations have enough resources of their own. 
Equity is the most undesirable option as it involves high flotation cost and also the 
controlling power of the current shareholder lost with every new seasoned issue. Or-
ganizations follow the trade-off theory that postulates that managers tend to strike 
a balance between debt and equity options termed as capital structure. Debt is a 
preferable option also due to the tax advantage associated as compared to the equity. 
Growing firms require more external resources due to the growth potentials. 
Growing organizations face constraints while accessing the external equity, but if 
somehow they manage to get it, the terms of such financing are not reasonable as 
they will be required to pay more in the shape of interests and other associated costs. 
The chances of failure of immature firms are also comparatively quite high. So, the 
growth possibility of small and medium companies is devastating (Huyghebaert & 
Van de Gucht, 2007). Durinck, Laveren, & Lybaert (1997), concluded that firms that 
experience rapid growth exploit more borrowed money as compared to equity. Their 
sample consisted of small and medium-sized enterprises in Belgium. This study 
supports the principles of the pecking order theory. Previous research supports a 
positive link between firm growth and debt financing (Heshmati, 2001; Honjo & Ha-
rada, 2006). At the same time, earlier studies like (Frank & Goyal, 2009) support a 
negative relationship between debt and an organization’s growth opportunities. Such 
studies argument that more growth opportunities leave limited cash resources that 
makes them unable to get a loan because they have less money to service the debt. 
Similarly, Myers (1977), raised an argument that firms with risky debt can reject the 
projects with positive net present values; this situation leads them to move towards 
equity to sustain their growth. It causes a negative relationship between growth op-
portunities and financial leverage. Autio, Sapienza, & Almeida (2000), claimed that 
there is a negative association between growth opportunities and age. Researchers 
like (Frank & Goyal, 2003; Myers, 1984), argue that small firms at a young age do 
not possess enough assets to be declared as collateral against debt and also face the 
problem of risky indebtedness due to much less information symmetry. Moreover, 
Leary and Roberts (2014), stress that financing decision is an internal decision taken 
by the firm’s management and should be treated as endogenous. However, firms can 
have similar financing structures if they tend to copy similar patterns. Mature firms 
have sufficient resources of their own and need to retain the market share and have 
lesser growth prospects. The life cycle theory divides the life of an organization into 
various life stages. Each stage has a varied necessity of resources. It means a grow-
ing firm should require more financial resources, and at the same time, the grown-up 
firm can get loans with comparative ease, but they might not need it. Therefore, due 
to this constrained external financial environment, new firms usually rely on equity 
or private loans to excel. This situation should oppose the common knowledge based 
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on the pecking order theory, or we may propose that there can be a reversal of the 
pecking order depending upon the life stages of an organization. Therefore, what 
effect growth opportunities have on the insolvency risk is noticeable and is also the 
focus of this research in the presence of financial decisions taken. Previous research 
is mostly confined to study this relationship in financial firms and that too, primarily 
for banks. There is little evidence of empirical testing in non-financial firms. We 
suggest that this situation may affect all the corporations as financial management 
is integral in today’s corporate governance scenario, and firm failures are also more 
consistent in other sectors even in the absence of a financial crisis. Whereas, financial 
institutions face and trigger such disliked outcomes mostly in the adverse macro-fi-
nancial environment. Moreover, financial institutions are protected by various safety 
nets and insurance provisions that may lead managers to gulp more risk, but non-fi-
nancial managers could be behaving differently, but it needs to be tested empirically 
and more frequently.
Firms with growth opportunities require more financing as compared to the 
ones with lesser chances. Managers look towards borrowed finance after consuming 
owned resources in such situations. Borrowed capital is also attractive because it has 
less related costs like floatation cost, agency cost, and also tax benefits. However, 
debt is thought to be riskier and can cause bankruptcy if not appropriately managed 
but still preferred over equity as posited by pecking order theory. Evidence on the 
relation between growth and debt is mixed. Many studies prove this relationship to be 
positive, like (Pandey, 2001; Chen & Zhao, 2006). There is also enough evidence that 
supports a negative relationship between growth opportunities and financial lever-
age (Goyal, Lehn, & Rcic, 2002; Billet, King, & Mauer, 2007). Decisions regarding 
leverage also involve the choice to choose between short term and long term debt. To 
tackle the issues of a lower level of investment and asset substitution, organizations 
with more profitable opportunities to grow will tend to reduce the maturity of their 
debt structure (Barclay & Smith, 1995; Cuñat, 1999). This issue becomes more acute 
for firms that have utilized their internal resources and are now targeting external 
resources to keep-up with their projects. Researchers like Akerlof (1970) Leland & 
Pyle (1977), Ross (1977), and Yosha (1995), are the supporters of signaling theory and 
on its relevance, support the argument that profitable organizations, having growth 
prospects and good credit standing will opt for short term financing. They may also 
enjoy the benefits of less associated costs as compared to the organizations experi-
encing financial crunch. This situation can pose rollover risk as the firm needs to 
refinance its growth after regular intervals and cause an illiquidity problem support-
ed by liquidity theory. Financially stable organizations can cope with the short term 
debt without any increment in insolvency risk because they have better information 
symmetry and are in a better position to easily roll on their short term financing 
(Flannery, 1986; Stohs & Mauer, 1996). 
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Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
Growth Opportunities and Insolvency Risk
Growth opportunities cannot be viewed without taking into account threats and as-
sociated risks. Such uncertainty is varied across segments, and the firms which focus 
diversification in their products or the business segments have more growth opportu-
nities as compared the concentrated organizations. Such an organization also suffers 
less as to the risk because it also gets diversified as compared to the focused firm. If 
we rank those opportunities higher that have less associated risk, then the organiza-
tions with such opportunities will be well off as compared to their counterparts. Such 
options contribute significantly to the value of firms (Kester, 1984; Danbolt, Hirst, & 
Jones, 2002). Anderson & Garcia-Feijoo (2006), inferred that investment opportuni-
ties have a strong affiliation to future stock returns and the value of the firm. Cao, 
Simin, and Zhao (2008), also supported the existence of incremental idiosyncratic 
risk caused by growth opportunities. Berk, Green, & Naik (1999), discussed that 
risky growth options could predict firm value. They also captured the heterogeneity 
already embodied in growth options that leads to varying risk levels. There is also 
a stream of researchers that support the free cash flow hypothesis (McConnell & 
Servaes, 1995; Lang, Ofek, & Stulz, 1996). This argument facilitates a situation of 
over investment. Overinvestment leads to the consumption of funds on non-profitable 
growth opportunities, and underinvestment leads to letting go of profitable opportu-
nities technically regarded as projects with positive NPV (Brealey, Myers, & Allen, 
2008). Both overinvestment and underinvestment are value-destroying and harm firm 
performance. Previous empirical findings found a negative effect of overinvestment 
and underinvestment on firm performance Titman, Wei, & Xie (2004), Yang (2005) 
and Fu (2010) regarded this scenario equally devastating for any organization. In-
formation asymmetry and wrong selection are also phenomena that become relevant 
in the presence of opportunities to grow (Alonso, Lopez, & Rodriguez, 2005). Am-
aral (2008), postulated that the firms which follow rapid growth are also the ones 
that become victims of failure more often. However, it is also true that small firms 
grow faster as compared to large ones. Elgers and Murray (1982), proved a statisti-
cally significant association among growth opportunities, debt, size, and risk. Their 
data consisted of accounting variables. A study conducted by Fewings (1975), also 
theoretically witnessed how the growth in organizational profit and profit on shares 
affects the risk of common shares. There exists a positive relationship between these 
growth potentials and risks. Skinner & Sloan (2002), regarded it as a market-wide 
phenomenon in the sense that growing firms may experience fewer earnings and are 
under constant pressure to avoid any earning surprise to access quality capital with 
less cost factor at the same time. Beaver,  Kettler, & Scholes (1970), said that it is 
because organizations need to represent stable earnings and such efforts to smooth 
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earnings may increase a factor of accrual basis because fluctuated earnings can cause 
more firm-level risk. Gray & Johnson (2011), studied the impact of growth on stock 
returns but didn’t find any explanation of the associated risk. Similarly, Gomes, Ko-
gan & Lu (2003), said that growth opportunities are a risk, and existing assets are not. 
They noted that growth opportunities usually are exercised by getting loans against 
the existing. 
Various studies support a positive link between growth and risk, but it depends 
on the life stage an organization is going through (Kim B. , 2011; Akbar, Akbar , 
Tang, & Qureshi, 2019; Habib & Hasan, 2015). Usually, firms at initial stages tend 
to grow to gain sustainability and shift towards more mature and stable stages. To 
achieve this milestone, they have to go through various available options to select. If 
they do not find any opportunities, they will squeeze their existence and hence move 
towards bankruptcy. It means if an organization in early growth phases does not 
find suitable growth opportunities within acceptable risk levels will eventually come 
up as a failure. So, to grow, an organization must have to take risks, which are an 
associated bundle with growth opportunities. If organizations take calculated risks 
that are bearable with managed opportunities, the chances of insolvency may reduce. 
Therefore, one can propose the following hypothesis:
H1=There is a significant relationship between growth opportunities and insol-
vency risk.
Growth Opportunities and Financing Decisions
Organizations with growth potentials enjoy the better market value and also better 
assets in place, but their expected income streams are delayed. They need finance 
at present to ensure future income flows. So, they usually tilt towards borrowing to 
catch up with these growth opportunities (Parsons & Titman, 2007). Frank & Goyal, 
(2009) and Dudley, (2012), on the other hand, say that such firms can easily generate 
new equity and are considered overvalued firms in the market. Some studies report a 
nonlinear relationship between growth and external debt (Wu & Yeung, 2012). They 
stated that if more impetus is on the assets in place, then firms will usually go for debt 
and on the contrary, for equity. Two contradictory theories explain this phenomenon. 
One being the pecking-order theory proposed by Myers (1984), which favors the use 
of debt over equity while agency cost theory purports an opposite direction in which 
managers tend to play safe, and such firms are thought to be ownership controlled. 
Researchers like Chaplinsky & Niehaus (1990) and Jensen & Meckling (1976) are 
the ones that prove a negative relationship between growth opportunities and debt 
ratio, especially in growing firms. Baral (2004), also suggested high agency costs for 
growing firms in growing industries and regarded more growth potentials being the 
reason.
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If we dig more into this relationship, the previous research also detects the rela-
tionship between growth opportunities and long term debt and between growth op-
portunities and the short term debt. Long term debt is thought to be positively asso-
ciated with growth, whereas short term debt has a negative association. Researchers 
that support this argument include Abor & Biekpe (2009). Ahsan, Wang & Qureshi, 
(2016), and Alipour, Mohammadi & Derakhshan (2015) used different proxies for 
growth opportunities like growth in sales and growth in assets and reported the neg-
ative relationship of these proxies with short term, long term, and total debt ratio. 
Barnea, Haugen & Senbet (1980), explained a lower level of sensitivity to short term 
debt as asset value fluctuate slightly in short time horizons which helps managers 
to tackle asset substitution problem and Carey & Rosen, (2001) and Chemmanur & 
Fulghieri, (1994) inferred that the flexibility of credit terms offered by banks and also 
the ability to negotiate for debt allows adjusting the maturity of obligations obtained. 
So, as managers, we can use debt maturity to control agency problems. If the expiry 
period of debt is more extended than the execution of selected opportunities, such a 
situation can lead to higher firm value.
Firms with growth opportunities require more financing as compared to the 
ones with lesser chances. Managers look towards borrowed finance after consuming 
owned resources in such situations. Borrowed capital is also attractive because it 
has less related costs like floatation, agency, and even tax benefits. However, debt is 
thought to be riskier and can cause bankruptcy if not appropriately managed but still 
preferred over equity as posited by pecking order theory. Evidence on the relation be-
tween growth and debt is mixed. Many studies prove this relationship to be positive, 
like (Modigliani & Miller, 1958; Pandey, 2001; Chen & Zhao, 2006). There is also 
enough evidence that supports a negative relationship between growth opportunities 
and financial leverage (Myers, 1977; Titman & Wessels, 1988; Goyal, Lehn, & Rcic, 
2002; Billet, King, & Mauer, 2007). Decisions regarding leverage also involve the 
decision to choose between short term and long term debt. 
H2=There is a significant impact of growth opportunities on firm financing deci-
sions.
Financing Decisions and Insolvency Risk
The research on the relationship between financing decisions and risk is confined to 
financial organizations, and there is a scarcity of literature that addresses this issue 
in non-financial firms. Previous research has also established this argument that risk 
levels are kept in mind while choosing among debt and equity. However, it does not 
address the post-decision effects that what influence does a particular decision has on 
the insolvency risk of a corporation. Does it succeed in mitigating or avoiding insol-
vency risk? A risk at the macroeconomic level leads to an increase in cash reserves 
(Almeida, Campello, & Weisbach, 2004; Baum, Caglayan, Stephan, & Talavera , 
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2008), and entrenched managers try to borrow at expensive terms. There is scarce 
literature that discusses the after-effects of more debt as part of capital structure. 
Chung, (1989), reported a positive relationship between financial leverage and risk 
inherited in assets, whereas Hamada (1972), indicate a positive association between 
risk and debt. Gertler & Hubbard (1993), reported that the firm-specific risk is con-
trollable, but risk at the macro level is beyond a firm’s control while they were trying 
to detect the association of such risks with financial decisions. Many researchers like 
Brealey & Myers (1981), Castanias (1983), and Bradley et al. (1984) proved an inverse 
relationship between idiosyncratic risk and financial leverage. The organization dis-
courages debt because of its ties with bankruptcy. This phenomenon discussed under 
the trade-off theory as bankruptcy hypothesis. There is another stream of research 
that examines this negative relationship as a way to reduce the cost during financial 
distress. Organizations that are not sure about their future cash flows tend to reduce 
the proportion of debt to avoid debt-related costs.  Myers (1977), findings were oppos-
ing these two arguments who instead opted for agency cost hypothesis. He proved a 
positive relationship between risk and financial leverage, arguing that more debt will 
help control agency problem as the debt is a tool to discipline the managers. Similar 
arguments are presented by several other authors like Jaffe & Westerfield (1987), 
Kim and Sorensen (1986)(1986), and Chu & Chiou (1992). Toy, Stonehill, Remmers 
& Wright (1974), proved a positive relationship between earning volatility and lever-
age of firms based in the US, Japan and Norway. Another critical study conducted by 
Kale, Noe & Ramirez (1991), examined a negative association among risk and lever-
age up to an extent but became positive afterward. Heckbarth, Miao, and Morellec, 
(2006), stated that the use of debt by an organization is dependent upon macroeco-
nomic situation in an economy and termed this relationship as pro-cyclical.  Levy 
and Hennessy (2007), regarded the equity issue as pro-cyclical and claimed that debt 
levels reduced in adverse macroeconomic conditions. Chen (2010), made his analysis 
interesting by capturing the discount rates that increase in adverse macroeconomic 
conditions, which reduce discounted tax benefits and also make future cash flows 
vaguer, resultantly a reduction in the use of financial leverage. 
Debt maturity refers to the use of long term and short term debt in a firm’s cap-
ital structure. Debt is thought to be risky in comparison to equity, but the debt with 
shorter maturities can have even more deteriorating effects. It needs refinancing; oth-
erwise, the firm will face illiquidity as proposed by liquidity theory. So the firm faces 
rollover risk to finance its operations. This situation opposed by agency theory and 
signaling theory. However, proponents of information asymmetry advocate the use 
of short term debt (Flannery, 1986; Diamonds, 1991). The sound organizations can 
obtain the desired debt maturity as they possess better information symmetry.  Firms 
should get long term loans just before their financial health starts deteriorating be-
cause it will provide them with resources for more extended periods, which will also 
inhibit the possible rollover risk faced otherwise. Overload of debt is also a scenario 
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in this case, but it can be possible within both debt streams, but it is more severe in 
case of longterm debt as posited by Moyen (2007). Scherr & Hulburt (2001), said that 
the relationship between debt maturity and the risk of default is not monotonic. Fur-
ther, based on Altman’s Z score, they divided the firms into three categories named 
firms with high, low and medium levels of default probability. They proved that debt 
maturity for low and high default probability firms is low as compared to firms with 
medium default probabilities. Titman & Tsyplakov (2007), and Leland (1994b), said 
that the short term loan is used to deal with the problem of under-investment, but it 
increases the chances of default at the time. Diamond & He (2014), regarded debt 
with shorter maturities as a reason for under-investment in cases where the obliga-
tion expires even before the investment decision. He & Xiong (2009) and Morris 
& Shin (2016), argued that there might arise a problem of illiquidity, and failure of 
terms with the creditors may cause a higher rollover risk and put firms under dis-
tress. Brunnermeier & Pedersen (2009), Acharya, Gale, & Yorulmzer (2009) and 
Shleifer & Vishny (2009), discussed that such a situation allows the lenders to dictate 
unfavorable terms on loans. It may include more margins on mortgage loans, which 
ultimately, in case of failure, can lead to the liquidation of assets. Morris (1976), also 
discussed that firms might fall short of cash flows if debt maturity is much less as 
they will fail to generate enough money too early to meet the debt obligations. This 
situation can also haunt in case of long term debt, but its probability is very low, and it 
also enables us to get rid of the current rollover risk. In the case of long term debt, the 
assets may retire before the loan payment date, and may not generate abundant cash 
flows. That’s the reason theoretical discussions favor maturity matching approaches.
H3 = There is a significant impact of financing decisions on insolvency risk.
Mediating Role of Financing Decisions
Previous literature proves a positive relationship between growth opportunities and 
leverage decisions (Hamada, 1972; Gertler & Hubbard, 1993). Firms tend to increase 
debt in their capital structure to take advantage of the possible investment opportuni-
ties, and the use of more debt leads to the increase in the insolvency risk (Castanias, 
1983; Bradley, Jarrel, & Kim , 1984). The debt structure also involves debt maturity. 
The choice between short term and long term debt is dependent upon the available 
profitable growth opportunities. Short term debt is considered to hamper the firms 
more that have less information asymmetry. The timeline of the debt also deter-
mines the level of insolvency risk as short term debt causes more risk as compared 
to the long term debt called rollover risk. Past studies have developed a mediating 
role of capital structure (Naseem, Lin, Rehman, Ahmad, & Ali, 2019; Van Essen, 
Van Oosterhout, & Carney, 2012; Detthamronga, Chancharata, & Vithessonthi, 2017; 
Ramli, Latan, & Solovida, 2018; Kassim, Ishak, & Manaf, 2013; Ramli & Nartea, 
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2016; Zhang, Venus, & Wang, 2012), but there is a lack of research that considers 
debt maturity along with capital structure as a mediator ( Umrie & Yuliani, 2014), 
collectively regarded as a financing decision in a single study. Recently, Naseem et 
al. (2019), studied the impact of the CEO’s personal and organizational attributes on 
performance by using the data of 179 listed Pakistani firms from 2009 to 2015. Their 
results proved significant, and also the debt to equity ratio partially mediated this re-
lationship. Similarly, Detthamronga et al. (2017), split his sample firms into small and 
large sub-samples. He detected the impact of the audit committee on performance 
in large firms and audit reputation on performance in small firms. Moreover, the re-
lationship between audit committee size and the firm performance had a mediating 
effect of leverage decisions in large firms. La Rocca (2007), argued that the role of 
moderation or mediation of capital structure should be considered on the relation 
between corporate governance and firm’s value. Van Essen et al. (2012), reported that 
the mediating role of the capital structure must be addressed while studying the role 
of corporate governance. It is meaningless to consider the role of corporate gover-
nance especially board characteristics, without analyzing the decisions, mechanisms 
and processes opted by management that brings variation in performance and other 
outcomes at the firm level. Firms take leverage decisions to support their financing 
needs to avail the set of opportunities to grow and prosper. Ramli et al. (2018), did 
a comparative study on Malaysian and Indonesian firms for a period of 1990-2010. 
They used PLS-SEM (Partial least squares-structural equation modeling) in their re-
search and detected the mediating effect of leverage in Malaysian firms while study-
ing the impact of asset structure, growth opportunities, tax, liquidity, and interest on 
firm performance. No such evidence found in Indonesian firms. Kassim et al. (2013), 
examined the influence of the board process on firm performance with capital struc-
ture decisions as a mediator. The presence of the mediating variable helps to explain 
the impact of board characteristics, including ownership structure and board struc-
ture on firm performance. So, the following hypothesis can be drawn:
H4= Financing decisions have a mediating effect on the relationship between 
growth opportunities and insolvency risk.
Data Sample and Methodology
Data sample
This study includes all non-financial firms listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange 
(PSX) subject to the availability of data for five years ranging from 2013 to2017. The 
data were extracted from the Financial Statement Analysis of non-financial compa-
nies published by the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP). Following points are considered 
for eligibility of firms to include in the sample:
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1. All those firms which had missing values excluded from the sample.
2. Only those firms secured their presence in the sample, which was continuously in 
operation during the study period.
3. Those firms which had data from the year 2008 included because data for five 
years before the study period was required to calculate the standard deviation of 
return on asset.
Based on the criteria defined above and the requirements of data analysis follow-
ing table includes the complete sample description. The SBP represents the economic 
groups defined in the table below until the year 2017.    
  Table 1: Sector-wise Distribution of the Sample with Large and Small Firms
Economic Groups Total Dropped Included Large Small
1) Textiles 136 07 129 48 81
2) Sugar 30 02 28 20 08
3) Food 16 03 13 06 07
4) Chemicals, chemical products and 
Pharmaceuticals 43
07 36 19 17
5) Manufacturing 31 04 27 12 15
6) Mineral products 9 03 06 03 03
7) Cement 17 00 17 17 00
8) Motor vehicles, trailers and auto parts 18 00 18 13 05
9) Fuel & Energy 22 07 15 12 03
10) Information, Communication & transport 
Services 11
01 10 09 01
11) Coke and refined petroleum products 10 01 09 09 00
12) Paper, paperboard and products 9 01 08 04 04
13) Electrical machinery and apparatus 7 01 06 03 03
14) Other services activities 10 02 08 05 03
Total: 369 39 330 180 150
This table shows that textile is the most crucial sector of the PSX which is the ma-
jor Stock Exchange of the Country making a count of 136 firms out of which only 07 
firms dropped. All other sectors are relatively small as compared to the textiles but 
are given fair representation in the sample. However, a total of 330 companies made 
their place in the sample out of 369 non-financial firms listed on PSX. We divided the 
primary sample into further two sub-samples based on size as Detthamronga et al., 
(2017). We calculated the median value of assets and segregated the data based on it. 
Firms having assets excess of the median value are placed as large firms and others 
as small. Resultantly, placed 180 firms in Panel B and other 150 firms in Panel C.
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Measurement of Variables
Dependent Variable
This study aims at investigating the impact of growth led financing on insolvency 
risk. Therefore, insolvency risk treated as a dependent variable for Pakistan based 
non-financial listed firms. We used an accounting-based insolvency risk measure de-
scribed as the Z-score model (Roy, 1952). The proxy Z-score used by the previous re-
searchers like Laeven & Levine (2009), Houston, Lin, Lin, & Ma (2010), and Akbar, 
Kharabsheh, Poletti-Hughes & Shah (2017). A higher value of the Z-score indicates 
that a firm has low insolvency risk and vice versa. Z-score risk calculated through 
the following equation:
Insolvency risk = 1 / [(ROA + CAR) / (S. D ROA)]
Where, ROA represents the return on assets of all sample firms, CAR refers to the 
capital asset ratio, which is an output of division between total equity and total assets. 
Total equity also includes reserves both capital and revenue and even any surplus on 
revaluation of assets along with book value of shares as represented by SBP in finan-
cial statement analysis of non-financial firms. The notation S.D ROA stands for the 
standard deviation of return on assets. For this purpose, we used the return on assets 
of five years before the study period in this study. Pathan (2009), took the inverse of 
Z-score to calculate insolvency risk and reported that higher Z-score refers to the 
level of higher firm-level solvency.  
Independent Variable
As already discussed, this study focus on the impact of growth opportunities on the 
dependent variable, so, we treat them as the independent variable. There are several 
proxies used over the years for the measurement of growth, but we have preferred a 
more endogenous proxy that focuses on the assets of the firm in this study. An asset 
growth index calculated as in Bei & Wijewardana (2012), Peng (2015) and Cooper, 
Gulen, & Schill (2008) with the formula given below;
Growth Opportunities= (Assetst /Assetst-1)-1 
Mediating Variable
In this study, we have analyzed the impact of growth driven financing decisions on 
the insolvency risk of listed firms. Therefore, we want to examine the mediating 
role of financing decisions on the relationship between growth opportunities and in-
solvency risk. Financing decisions have two aspects of this study. One refers to the 
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contribution of debt and equity in the capital structure of a company. The proxy for 
capital structure is ‘Debt Ratio’ (DR) which is calculated by dividing long term debt 
to total assets, similar to the one used by Heyman, Deloof and Ooghe, (2008), Sheikh 
and Wang (2012), Vakilifard, Gerayli, Yanesari and Ma’atoofi (2011), and Ibrahim 
and Lau (2019). The second part of the financing decision is ‘Debt Maturity Ratio’ 
(DMR), which is measured by the ratio between long term debt and total debt (Bar-
clay & Smith, 1995; Orman & Bu¨lent , 2015).
Control Variable
We have used three control variables in this study. The first one is profitability as higher 
profits are associated with higher risk levels, so we tend to control its effect, and we 
used basic earnings per share as a proxy for this variable. Tax saving is an essential 
element that motivates the managers to tilt their capital structure more towards debt. 
Therefore, we have considered tax separately as a control variable. We have also con-
trolled the size effects by taking natural logged assets as our third control variable. The 
variable names, their notations, and methods of measurement explained in table 2.
Table 2: Operational Definition of Variables
Variable Notation Measurement
Insolvency Risk IR(Insolvency Risk) 1 / [(ROA + CAR) / (S. D ROA)]
Growth Opportunities GO(Growth Opportunities) Rate of growth of the firm’s total assets
Financing Decision DR(Debt Ratio) Total long term debt divided by total Assets
DMR(Debt Maturity Ratio) Long term Debt divided by total Debt
Controls EPS(Profitability) The ratio of net profit to shares outstanding
lnTAX(Tax Expense) Natural log of total expenses
lnSIZE(Total Assets) Natural log of total assets
Research Methodology
To detect the indirect and direct effects in mediation analysis, we will use Baron & 
Kenny’s (1986) approach considering the suggestions of Hsu, Wang & Hsu (2012), 
and Guizani (Guizani, 2018). Baron & Kenny’s (1986) method involves the testing of 
relationships in the following steps:
1.  Checking the impact of Independent Variable (IV) on the Mediator (M).
2. Testing the effect of the Independent Variable (IV) on the Dependent Variable (DV).
3.  Checking the impact of both the Independent Variable (IV) and Mediator (M) on 
Dependent Variable (IV).
Hsu et al. (2012) and Guizani (2018), explained that four conditions must be met 
to conduct a mediation analysis. They said that there should be a significant impact 
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of the independent variable on the dependent variable, then the independent variable 
must influence the mediator. Further, the mediator affects the dependent variable and 
finally analyzing the impact of the independent variable on the dependent variable 
after controlling the mediation effects in the same regression. We will follow the 
Baron and Kenny’s (1986) approach comprising of three steps as the last step is a 
combination of the previous two conditions set out by Hsu et al. (2012), so, we don’t 
need to regress dependent Variable on mediator separately. Moreover, three alter-
native scenarios may emerge as a result when we undergo these three steps. Firstly, 
there will be full mediation if the impact of independent variables no longer remains 
significant in the presence of the mediator. Secondly, there will be partial mediation 
if this impact remains substantial, but the coefficient values and level of significance 
fluctuates. If none of the above conditions are met, then there will be no mediation.
Above mentioned possible relationships are explained through the following func-
tions. 
Step 1:
Capital Structure=f(Growth Opportunities, Controls)
Debt Maturity=f(Growth Opportunities, Controls)
Step 2:
Insolvency Risk =f(Growth Opportunities, Controls)
Step 3:
Insolvency Risk=f(Growth Opportunities, Capital Structure, Controls)
Insolvency Risk=f(Growth Opportunities, Debt Maturity, Controls
The resultant regression equations can be written as follows:
Various diagnostics performed to assess the nature and suitability of our analysis. To 
cope with the multicollinearity, we use the variance inflation factor (VIF) analysis. Its 
critical value limit is ten, as stated by Studenmund (2006). A VIF value greater than 10, 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, 𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1(𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷, 𝑡𝑡) + 𝛽𝛽2(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷, 𝑡𝑡) +  𝛽𝛽3(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷, 𝑡𝑡) +  𝛽𝛽4(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷, 𝑡𝑡) +
 ɛ𝑡𝑡_________________________________________________________________________(1) 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, 𝑡𝑡 =  𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1(𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷, 𝑡𝑡) + 𝛽𝛽2(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷, 𝑡𝑡) +  𝛽𝛽3(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷, 𝑡𝑡) +  𝛽𝛽4(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷, 𝑡𝑡) +
 ɛt_________________________________________________________________________(2) 
𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, 𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1(𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷, 𝑡𝑡) + 𝛽𝛽2(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷, 𝑡𝑡) +  𝛽𝛽3(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷, 𝑡𝑡) +  𝛽𝛽4(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷, 𝑡𝑡) +
 ɛ𝑡𝑡_________________________________________________________________________(3) 
𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, 𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1(𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷, 𝑡𝑡) + 𝛽𝛽2(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, 𝑡𝑡) +  𝛽𝛽3(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷, 𝑡𝑡) +  𝛽𝛽4(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷, 𝑡𝑡) +  𝛽𝛽4(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷, 𝑡𝑡) +
 ɛ𝑡𝑡_________________________________________________________________________(4) 
𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, 𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1(𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷, 𝑡𝑡) + 𝛽𝛽2(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, 𝑡𝑡) +  𝛽𝛽3(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷, 𝑡𝑡) +  𝛽𝛽4(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷, 𝑡𝑡) +  𝛽𝛽5(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷, 𝑡𝑡) +
 ɛ𝑡𝑡________________________________________________________________________ (5) 
 
Various diagnostics performed to assess the nature and suitability of our analysis. To cope 
with the multicollinearity, we use the variance inflation factor (VIF) analysis. Its critical value 
limit is ten, as stated by Studenmund (2006). A VIF value greater than 10, points towards the very 
high multicollinearity among the variables under consideration in the regression model. To detect 
serial correlation, we employed the Breusch Godfrey test. There are various ways to fix this 
problem, and one of them is to place the lagged value of the dependent variable among the 
explanatory variable. So, we used this approach wherever this issue detected in our models. We 
applied the Breusch Pagan/Cook Weisberg test to identify whether there exists any heterogeneity 
in our models. In the case of non-homoscedastic data series, the underlying assumption of constant 
standard errors is violated, and we need to fix this issue while performing OLS. If this problem is 
not countered then the resultant standard errors may (usually) be underestimated, and spurious 
coefficients may pollute your regression inferences. In the case of panel data that means cross-
sections observed on different time intervals, one way to fix this problem is robust clustering 
(Cameron & Miller, 2015). It also implies that in panel data, there may be correlated model errors 
within clusters but may be uncorrelated across groups, for example, panel observations for the 
individual persons, regions, or firms, as in our case.  So, we used robust clustered standard errors 
in our linear regressions to estimate our results.   
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Total Firms Panel A 
Variables Observations Mean Std.Deviation Minimum Maximum 
IR 1650 0.622 20.802   -408.535   664.670 
GO 1650 0.092  0.472 -0.971    12.140 
DMR 1650 0.270 0.218 0 0.998 
DR 1650 0.206      0.607 0 10.801 
EPS 1650 10.653     46.787     -435.98      728.78 
lnSIZE 1650 14.985     1.991    7.044    20.256 
lnTAX 1650 16.414      0.401    0.693    17.937 
Large Firms Panel B 
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points towards the very high multicollinearity among the variables under consideration 
in the regression model. To detect serial correlation, we employed the Breusch Godfrey 
test. There are various ways to fix this problem, and one of them is to place the lagged 
value of the dependent variable among the explanatory variable. So, we used this ap-
proach wherever this issue detected in our models. We applied the Breusch Pagan/Cook 
Weisberg test to identify whether there exists any heterogeneity in our models. In the 
case of non-homoscedastic data series, the underlying assumption of constant standard 
errors is violated, and we need to fix this issue while performing OLS. If this problem 
is not countered then the resultant standard errors may (usually) be underestimated, and 
spurious coefficients may pollute your regression inferences. In the case of panel data that 
means cross-sections observed on different time intervals, one way to fix this problem is 
robust clustering (Cameron & Miller, 2015). It also implies that in panel data, there may 
be correlated model errors within clusters but may be uncorrelated across groups, for ex-
ample, panel observations for the individual persons, regions, or firms, as in our case.  So, 
we used robust clustered standard errors in our linear regressions to estimate our results. 
Results and Discussion
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
Total Firms Panel A
Variables Observations Mean Std.Deviation Minimum Maximum
IR 1650 0.622 20.802 -408.535 664.670
GO 1650 0.092 0.472 -0.971 12.140
DMR 1650 0.270 0.218 0 0.998
DR 1650 0.206 0.607 0 10.801
EPS 1650 10.653 46.787 -435.98 728.78
lnSIZE 1650 14.985 1.991 7.044 20.256
lnTAX 1650 16.414 0.401 0.693 17.937
Large Firms Panel B
IR 900 0.177 15.283 -408.535 121.695
GO 900 0.103 0.416 -.874 9.87657
DMR 900 0.270 0.198 0 0.939
DR 900 0.145 0.127 0 0.874
EPS 900 20.002 58.282 -435.98 728.78
lnSIZE 900 16.341 1.169 14.255 20.256
lnTAX 900 16.426 0.543 0.693 17.937
Small Firms Panel C
IR 750 1.156 25.919 -56.814 664.670
GO 750 0.078 0.531 -.971 12.140
DMR 750 0.270 0.239 0 0.998
DR 750 0.278 0.885 0 10.801
EPS 750 -0.566 22.607 -215.83 255.12
lnSIZE 750 13.358 1.495 7.044 15.540
lnTAX 750 16.400 0.002 16.381 16.420
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The above table-3 represents the descriptive analysis for all the three panels under 
consideration in this study. We used insolvency risk as an explanatory variable in 
our study. The above table reports that the overall mean value for insolvency risk is 
0.622. Small firms are riskier as compared to large firms with mean values of 1.156 
and 0.177, respectively. Small firms are also facing problems in growing their assets 
as they have the lowest growth rate in terms of beta value that equals 0.078. It states 
that these firms face high risk without considerably taking advantage of the growth 
opportunities. It is interesting to note that all three samples have similar debt matur-
ities of 0.27, which explains the proportion of long term debt in their debt structure. 
However, the total debt ratio describes the scenario differently as small firms have 
more percentage of borrowed money in their capital structure as compared to large 
firms. The mean value of the debt ratio is 0.278 in small firms as compared to the 
0.145 in large firms, which appears almost double in value. Similarly, large firms 
have earnings per share (EPS) of 20.02, but it is volatile, with a standard deviation 
of 58.28. Whereas, small firms represent the negative mean value of earnings per 
share, i.e., -0.566.  There is not much difference in the tax values as the mean value 
of logarithm tax expenses is around 16.4 in the three samples under consideration.
Table 4: Correlations and Variance Inflation Factors 
IR GO DMR DR EPS lnSIZE lnTAX VIF
IR 1
GO -0.041 1 1.02
DMR 0.027 0.094 1 1.21
DR -0.002 -0.03 0.372 1 1.26
EPS 0.007 0.053 -0.034 -0.05 1 1.04
lnSIZE 0.006 0.031 0.055 -0.234 0.186 1 1.12
lnTAX 0 0.008 0.01 -0.007 0.027 0.034 1 1
Table 4 represents the correlation coefficients of all variables in the overall sample 
with 1650 number of observations. We found that the value of correlation coefficients 
among all variables is below 0.50, so there can be no issue of multicollinearity. How-
ever, to further investigate this issue, we employed the variance inflation factor (VIF). 
The values for VIF analysis are much lower than the critical value, which indicates 
that there is no multicollinearity among the variables.
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Table 5: Regression Results for Panel-A














EPS 0.003          000 0.004          000 0.003
lnSIZE 0.065 0.004** 0.044 0.003** 0.060
lnTAX -0.024 -0.0001 -0.041 0.001 -0.024
R-square 0.0019 0.7130 0.0029 0.959 0.0019
Breusch Godfrey 1.008 790.619*** 1.124 985.007*** 1.049
Breusch Pagan/ Cook Weisberg 12.02*** 25.28*** 7.31*** 7111*** 60.78***
Note: Coefficients followed by * are significant at 10%, by ** are significant at 5%, and *** are significant at 1%.
The regression results for Panel- A reported in table-5. Model 1 shows the neg-
ative but insignificant impact of growth opportunities on insolvency risk with a co-
efficient of -1.865, which indicates an insignificant direct relationship among these 
variables. However, in model 2, growth opportunities have a positive and significant 
impact on the debt maturity ratio at a 5% level of significance with a beta coefficient 
of 0.025. Logarithmic value of size also has substantial implications for debt maturity 
ratio which indicates that the increase in assets causes a tendency to obtain long term 
debt. It supports the argument that a firm with more assets can be in a better position 
to use them as collateral to get loans. Mediation effects tested through model 3 for 
debt maturity ratio, which once again proposes an insignificant impact of growth 
opportunities on insolvency risk, but debt maturity has a positive effect on the in-
solvency ratio with a beta coefficient of 3.057 at 5% significance level. Therefore, 
it can be inferred that direct impact is insignificant, whereas, growth opportunities 
affect insolvency through debt maturity structure. In this table, model 4 reports the 
insignificant negative effect of growth opportunities on debt ratio with a -0.034 beta 
coefficient. Similarly, the relationship remains insignificant for growth opportunities 
and insolvency risk in model 5 and also for debt ratio and insolvency risk, which 
is designed to capture the mediating effects of capital structure. The heterogeneity 
problems were prevalent in all the five models controlled through robust clustering, 
and serial correlation detected in models 2 & 4. It was dealt with by using lagged 
variables of the dependent variables. 
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EPS 0.005* -0.0001** 0.006* -0.0001** 0.007*
lnSIZE 0.332 0.0044 0.216 0.003** 0.232
lnTAX -0.008 -0.0004 0.052 0.0001 0.023
R-square 0.0012 0.7974 0.0050 0.8190 0.0035
Breusch Godfrey 1.148 492.996*** 1.469 494.200*** 1.336
Breusch Pagan/ Cook Weisberg 259.67*** 0.450 363.64*** 11.310*** 461.50***
Note: Coefficients followed by * are significant at 10%, by ** are significant at 5%, and *** are significant at 1%.
Table-6 represents the regression results for large firms indicated as Panel-B. 
This table reports an insignificant and negative impact of growth opportunities on 
insolvency risk shown by the beta coefficient value of -0.475, as indicated in model 
1.  Model 2 predicts the positive effect of growth opportunities on the debt matu-
rity ratio at a 5% level of significance. The coefficient value for this relationship is 
0.033. The regression model 3 reports that by incorporating the debt maturity ratio 
as a mediator in the model, the impact of growth opportunities on insolvency risk 
has more strengthened as it’s beta coefficient becomes -0.071, and its p-value comes 
within a range of 5%. This result strongly supports the role of the debt maturity ratio 
as an intervening variable between the relationship of growth and insolvency risk. 
Model 4 once again reports the insignificant negative impact of growth opportuni-
ties on debt ratio, and the relationship between growth opportunities and insolvency 
risk remains insignificant even after the inclusion of debt ratio as a mediator. The 
debt ratio has a positive but also insignificant impact on insolvency risk as reported 
in model 5 results. Once again, heterogeneity observed for all models except model 
2. The case of serial correlation was similar to that of the overall sample in which it 
was detected for model 2 & 4. The same procedure is applied to address this issue 
for the Panel-B.
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EPS 0.0191*** -0.005*** 0.0185*** 0.0001 0.019***
lnSIZE 0.804 -0.0002 0.794 0.088** 0.809
lnTAX -152.379 -2.429 -143.234 3.881 -152.443
R-square 0.0056 0.4358 0.0057 0.6206 0.0056
Breusch Godfrey 0.322 317.381*** 0.329 460.985*** 0.323
Breusch Pagan/ Cook Weisberg 49.75*** 6.72*** 56.35*** 3283.39*** 49.89***
Note: Coefficients followed by * are significant at 10%, by ** are significant at 5%, and *** are significant at 1%.
The regression results for small firms represented by Panel-B reported in table-7. 
Model 1 indicates a significant negative impact of growth opportunities on insol-
vency risk with a coefficient value of -2.904. Growth opportunities also significant-
ly influence the debt maturity decision in small firms. The beta coefficient for this 
relationship is 0.038 at a 1% level of significance, as given in the column headed by 
model 2. Model 3 used to analyze the intervening effect of debt maturity shows that 
there is minimal variation in the beta coefficient of growth opportunities with a value 
of -2.951 at a p-value of less than 5%. The impact of the debt maturity ratio is positive 
but insignificant in this model, with a coefficient valuing 1.163. The effect of growth 
opportunities on overall debt usage is negative and negligible, with a beta value of 
-0.064. Model 5 also confirms a similar situation as that of the other two panels (A 
& B) for the debt ratio. The role of the debt ratio as a mediator is non-existent as the 
impact of the independent variable is unchanged, and also the influence of the me-
diator on insolvency risk is insignificant but positive with a beta coefficient of 0.024. 
Results regarding heterogeneity are also consistent as to previous panels, and serial 
correlation also found in models 2 & 4.
Table 8: Sobel’s Mediation Analysis
Panel-A Panel-B Panel-C
DMR Sobel’s t-stat 1.494* 1.681** 0.776
P-value 0.067 0.046 0.218
DR Sobel’s t-stat 0.858 1.110 0.109
P-value 0.195 0.133 0.456
Note: Coefficients followed by * are significant at 10%, by ** are significant at 5%, and *** are significant at 1%.
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We notice that Sobel’s test for the overall sample and large firms is significant at 
10% and 5%, respectively, as shown in table-8 for Panel A & B. Sobel’s t-statistics 
for all firms is 1.494 with a p-value of 0.067. Similarly, t-statistics for large firms is 
1.681 and a p-value of 0.046. However, an insignificant t-statistics value reported by 
Sobel’s test for small firms. Therefore, the results suggest that the debt maturity ratio 
has a partial mediation effect on the relationship between growth opportunities and 
insolvency risk. As for, the debt ratio is concerned, no mediation effects detected for 
all the three panels used in this study.  The impact of growth opportunities on insol-
vency risk is negative in all of the three samples, as reported by previous studies like 
(AlNajjar & Riahi-Belkaoui, 2001; Akbar, Akbar , Tang, & Qureshi, 2019; Shin & 
Stulz, 2000). The impact of growth opportunities on the debt maturity ratio is found 
to be positive and significant in all three samples, similar to (Ibrahim & Lau, 2019; 
Handoo & Sharma, 2014). It explains that more preference is given to long term debt 
in comparison to the short term debt. It validates the agency cost theory and negates 
the information asymmetry hypothesis. It is similar to the proposition made by Myers 
(1977). However, the effects of growth opportunities on capital structure are negative, 
as mentioned in studies, for example, (Padrón, Apolinario, Santana, Martel, & Sales, 
2005; Karpavičius & Yu, 2019) but insignificant. This negative association of growth 
with leverage negates the pecking order theory as firms rely more on equity in their 
capital structure. Debt maturity influenced insolvency risk positively, and it was sig-
nificant for panels A & B but insignificant for panel-C. Whereas, the impact of capital 
structure on insolvency risk represented by debt ratio is negative in the case of panel 
A similar to (Dierker, Lee, & Seo, 2019) but positive for Panel B & C as in (Bhagat, 
Bolton, & Lu, 2015). However, this relationship is insignificant in all three cases, as 
also reported by (Chung, Na, & Smith, 2013). 
Conclusion and Future Implications
This study focus on analyzing the mediating role of financing decisions on the rela-
tionship between growth opportunities and insolvency risk in Pakistani listed non-fi-
nancial firms. By using Baron & Kenny’s (1986) approach, we tried to capture the 
intervening effects of capital structure and debt maturity ratio for a sample of 330 
firms using annual data from 2013 to 2017. Financing decisions comprised of two 
major areas including the decision regarding capital structure and choice regarding 
debt maturity. The results prove a negative impact of growth opportunities on insol-
vency risk. The effect of growth opportunities on the debt maturity ratio is also found 
positive but tested negative for capital structure denoted by debt ratio. This situation 
means that firms play safely in case of availing growth opportunities and tend to get 
long term loans to satisfy their financial needs and avoid rollover risk. Conservative 
firms also tend to reduce the proportion of debt in their capital structure, and hence, 
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a negative association between growth and leverage ratio exists, which means these 
firms relied more on equity as compared to the debt. The impact of the debt maturity 
ratio showed a positive effect on insolvency risk, but in the case of capital structure, 
this relationship is negative. This situation explains that firms are unable to take ad-
vantage of the short term loan instead rely on the long term, which also is causing 
much risk in the listed firms. The negative association of leverage ratio with insol-
vency risk also indicates more reliance on equity than debt. We divided the overall 
sample into small and large firms on the basis median value of assets. The role of debt 
maturity ratio (DMR) was proved in the case of the sample of overall firms and large 
firms, whereas no such character detected when capital structure decisions used as a 
mediator. So, a partial mediation is established as further analyzed through Sobel’s 
test on the part of financing decisions. 
This study has multifaceted implications not only for academic users but also for 
managerial uses.  It describes the importance of financing decisions, which, if not 
appropriately taken, can lead to higher insolvency risk while executing the growth 
opportunities chosen. Hence, management needs to take necessary care while mak-
ing these decisions. The corporate debt structure is of equally great importance along 
with corporate structure decisions while implementing the financial policy of a com-
pany. Whereas prior literature mostly focuses on the importance of debt/equity struc-
ture, and due emphasis is not given to debt maturity structure. This research sheds 
light on this issue and that too in a mediating framework. Moreover, this analysis 
made on small and large companies as well. In large companies, the connectedness 
of financing decisions is quite evident, whereas small companies need to readdress 
this issue as they are riskier. So, it turns out to be very crucial for managers of small 
companies to align the firm’s resources in a way that may increase firm value by 
utilizing the available growth opportunities without indulging in unmanageable in-
solvency risk. Further, it is suggested that this analysis may be extended by using dif-
ferent samples and employing more independent variables that may include corporate 
board attributes like board composition, board structure, ownership structure, and 
personal characteristics of the board members. 
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